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Abstract 
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Routines are a large part of our daily lives. They are the skills that we utilize to get through 
our day effortlessly. From tying our shoes to operating a vehicle, routines are repeated skilled 
behaviors often initiated and produced with little attention or conscious focus. While 
routines are an important part of our lives, they are neglected by much of the literature on 
intentional action. This has led to some criticism that the intention literature is over-
intellectualized, and only focuses on behavior that has a concurrent conscious component. 
Further, some authors have even suggested that skilled behaviors like routines are not 
intentional whatsoever. This leads to the unfortunate conclusion that much of our daily 
behavior is not controlled by the agent, but by unconscious mechanisms. In this paper I 
hope to combat this view. I argue that we can understand routine behavior through a 
diachronic lens, where practice can be viewed as a conscious setting of a behavioral goal. 
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Routine Maintenance 
Joshua Waugh 
 
 
Routines are as pervasive as they are mundane. Behaviors such as tying your shoes or 
operating the coffee machine are not the type of activities you pay much mind to, and yet are 
necessary for getting through your day with convenience and compose most of what you do in any 
given day. While many would promptly label most instances of these activities as voluntary acts, 
recent works in both the empirical and philosophical literatures have attempted to undermine this 
intuition. Take tying your shoes as an example, the initiation and the production of the specific 
movements can be explained without reference to the agent. The initiation might just be a result of 
the relevant stimuli (untied shoes) triggering an already organized behavioral response (tying the 
shoes). Explanations that incorporate this rough description often label routine activities as 
automatic, rote, and in many cases, involuntary. If routines do encompass a great deal of our daily 
activities, then such an explanation of routines would diminish the category of behaviors an agent 
can have control over. This clashes with the strong intuition that routines are activities that we do 
have control over in respect to their initiation and production and would severely limit the kinds of 
behavior any theory of agency could adequately account for. If routines are explained purely through 
non-conscious, lower level mechanisms then this would make many standard accounts of agency 
explanatorily weak and disconnected from how we actually conduct ourselves.  
 This paper provides an explanatory framework for routines that allows for standard agential 
mechanisms of control like intention, higher-order goals, and deliberation to be diachronic factors in 
the initiation and production of routine behaviors. I will argue that by focusing on the creation of 
routines through practice, we can provide a diachronic explanation for routines that is not only 
agent centered but also captures the features that make routines unique. In Section 1 I will argue 
that the empirical evidence has led many to favor frameworks for routines that are too focused on 
2 
 
the immediate causes of behavior. This “synchronic viewpoint” unfairly limits the kind of 
explanation we can give for routines such that only the neurophyscial factors are treated as relevant 
causes. I believe that there is an explanatory framework that provides a historical account of routines 
that does constitutively involve the agent. In Section 2 I argue that practice is such an account for 
routines. Practice not only provides a framework for routines as agential, but also accounts for their 
automatic nature. In Section 3 I will elucidate the practice element and draw a direct connection 
between practice and agency. Finally, in Section 4 I will briefly consider some objections.  
 
Section 1 – Routines as Automatic 
 
1.1: The Difficulty with Routines 
 
Routines are a type of skilled behavior. Skills are patterns of learned behavior that are 
initiated and produced in a fast and efficient manner. Routines as a type of skill can be characterized 
as the mundane skills we perform on a daily basis that occur within a short time span.1 Examples of 
routines include operating a manual gearbox, locking your front door, whisking eggs, performing a 
push up, entering a password on your phone, peeling a banana, tying your shoes etc. They differ 
from other expert skills, like playing NBA level basketball, because routines are contained in terms 
of their environmental goals. The work on expertise, and especially the work on “flow” as it pertains 
to experts, have informed a lot of the present discussion and understanding of the relationship 
between automaticity and agency. However, there are stark differences between the study of routines 
and expert skills. For one, expert skills are often placed inside of an agent’s explicit reasoning. To 
play and practice basketball at the level of an expert requires advance organization and planning, 
                                                   
1 The definition of routines presented is partially indebted to Joëlle Proust (Proust 2015, 724). 
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features unseen in routines. Further, expert skills also fit explicitly within an agent’s value structure. 
Being expertly skilled at something requires that the agent value the time she puts into the practice. 
Again, this is not the case with routines.  
 Perhaps the most interesting difference between routines and expert skilled behavior is the 
requirement of the amount attention needed to successfully complete the given behavior. For expert 
skills, agency is often identified with the intense focus and attention needed. This attention is under 
some kind of cognitive control, where prior conscious goal setting influences that intention. For 
routines, however, this kind of attention is often lacking. The nature of routines is almost that we do 
not pay attention to them. Their mundane nature forces them out of our conscious interest. We can 
hold a conversation while tying our shoes, but we cannot play NBA level basketball and have a 
conversation. I will belabor this point throughout this paper, and the reason why is because most of 
the work dedicated to resolving the amount antimony between agency and the automatic is 
overwhelming focused on expert skilled behavior and not routines. There is a gap in the literature 
that must be resolved. 
As such, routines have two defining features: First, routines are not reliant on awareness or 
on focused attention2 in terms of their activation or production. We do not deliberate much (if at all) 
before tying our shoes, and we often do not think about the movements as they are being produced 
(consciously thinking about skilled movements while they are being produced diminishes 
performance). Second, the movements of a given routine will be similar across all instances of their 
performance. Tying our shoes involves the repetition of a set of movements in every instance of that 
                                                   
2 Attention and awareness can be considered technical terms, and my usage here deviates from the standard usage. The 
way I am using attention corresponds to a distinction given by Anne Treisman (2009) between focused attention, 
inattention, and divided attention. This distinction can be roughly captured by instances where a teacher yells at a pupil 
“pay attention!” Similarly, conscious awareness can be thought of quite generally. I do not deny that we are often 
conscious of routines being produced, but that routines are often not the locus of that awareness (and more generally, 
our concern). Similarly, lower level mechanisms of control are always utilizing attention, but focused attention concerns 
what the agent is currently attending to.  
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routine. While there will be mechanical differences from instance to instance, there will still be an 
identifiable pattern associated with every routine.3 
 These two features of routines make them incompatible with a common characterization of 
intentional acts as consciously monitored behaviors initiated by some kind of deliberative process (as 
espoused by Bargh et al. 2001; Haggard 2005; Libet 1999; Wegner 2003). The thought here is that 
most of the language and examples in the intention literature involves idealized instances of forming 
an intention, and is often presented as a deliberative procedure involving a conscious weighing 
between different options and possibilities. While the authors cited are hostile toward standard 
theories of intention, is not an uncommonly recognized problem within the intention literature itself 
that many of the examples and language surrounding intentions is too cognitive. The worry is that if 
intentions are too idealized, then it will not capture much of our behavior. Routines are activities 
that do not require any deliberation to be activated, and very rarely does anyone go through the 
conscious process of forming an intention to perform a routine. The normal experience of a routine 
like tying our shoes is just that we see our shoes untied and then proceed to tie our shoes. As we 
shall see later in the paper, the empirical evidence suggests that even the conscious awareness of this 
process is more peripheral than fundamental.  
The intuition behind these thoughts is nicely captured by David Velleman (2015, 330), who 
asks his readers to think about what goes through their minds when they are getting out of a chair: 
“If I may generalize from my own experience (to echo James), you will find that if you had any 
thought at all of getting up, it was more a speculation about getting up than a decision to do so. 
Then suddenly you were getting up.” Normal experience of routines is a lot like this: there is usually 
no prior deliberation, no prior decision to act before their activation and we do not pay close 
                                                   
3 I do not want to argue that routines form a natural class of distinct behaviors. The primary examples of routines set 
them apart, but there will be borderline cases. For example, posture fits the characterization but the behavior is extended 
temporally beyond any of the given routines and requires continuous tracking throughout the day.   
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enough attention to be consciously guiding the ensuing movements. Sometimes, behvior seems to 
just happen, and we are only aware of the effects. 
Even if we don’t take the above characterization at face value, routines are hard to pin down 
as agential in more nuanced theories. A more promising route, following Bratman, would argue that 
routines are agential in virtue of a higher order plan or policy. 4  Bratman argues that we can 
understand behaviors that are not initiated with concurrent deliberating through the larger context 
of planning. I may not deliberate where I am going to lunch, but nonetheless it may be an 
intentional act considering my overall commitments. For example, if I decide to get a salad for 
lunch, that can be understood through my prior commitment of sticking to a diet plan. Planning a 
road trip, or having the general policy of only driving a manual car, would necessitate initiating and 
producing the routine of operating a manual gearbox. In other words, we can make sense of the 
behavior involved in shifting with a manual gearbox when placed in the proper context; the 
seemingly automatic routine behavior is thus intentional within the wider context of planning a road 
trip.  
This route is unsatisfying, as it only circumvents the two defining features of routines. 
Routines are initiated and produced independent of any particular goal and may even be irrespective 
of any general policy. Tying your shoes is often not bound to any particular plan, or very rarely 
would anyone have the explicit policy of tying their shoes when their shoes are untied.5 Further, it 
makes little sense to say that anyone has an explicit policy to tie their shoes in contexts listed by a 
series of descriptive conditions. The origin of the higher order plan or policy could, and often does, 
                                                   
4 Routines themselves cannot be plans, as Bratman requires that plans are both the result of prior deliberation and open-
ended (Bratman 1987, 29). This almost directly contradicts the two defining features of routines. It is more complicated 
to ask if routines are policies. The most straightforward answer I could give is that policies as defined by Bratman are 
too broad of a category for routines. For example, the policy of being kind to strangers requires much more than any 
routine could capture. 
5 One could suggest that the policy of being “well maintained in appearance” or some other general policy would capture 
the routine of tying one’s shoes. I think the problem remains the same. These kinds of policies would be so general that 
they can capture many kinds of routines without the need of specifying any specific pattern of behavior. What we want 
is to explain that pattern in terms of the agent.  
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have its own explanation that is independent from the explanation of the origin of the routine. Rote 
practice may have more to do with tying our shoes then the values, plans, and policies agents have 
surrounding that behavior. I will argue that my framework not only explains how routines are 
agential, but also gives an account of how the specific movements involved in the routine can be 
explained in reference to the agent. Under this framework, the agent is not merely utilizing her 
routines but can actively dictate the when the routine is activated and the specific movements 
involved in their production.  
This more promising route still fails to adequately account for routines as agent centered 
activities. Routines are difficult to place in any theory of agency because of their common features. 
Yet, we should strive to find a way to explain how routines can be agential for two reasons. The first 
is just the fact that most people feel that their daily activity is not only set by them, but also that they 
do have a say in both initiating and producing routine behaviors. Second, we can imagine a case 
where a soldier performs a reflexive act that would be considered routine in wartime, but actually 
causes harm in a current civilian context. It is immediately unclear what kind of relationship the 
agent has to the behavior if we cannot incorporate such a routine into a theory of agency. This 
applies both to assessing moral blame or exculpation in this case. Routines not only play a large part 
in our daily lives, but they can also be central to certain cases of moral responsibility. 
The question then remains: what does cause routine behavior? More often than not, those 
influenced by the empirical literature do not point to the agent. In the following sub-sections I will 
review some of the evidence suggesting that because routines are automatized, they are thus 
involuntary. The effect of taking this evidence as explanatorily primary for routines is to adopt a 
“synchronic viewpoint” or the view that the only relevant explanation for the initiation and 
 7 
production of behavior are the immediate factors that take place just before the behavior occurs.6 
This viewpoint is flawed, and I will show that routine behaviors can have a diachronic explanation 
that relies on the element of practice. Ultimately, I hope to show that by thinking of practice as a 
diachronic element, we can explain routines not only with respect to intentions but also to the agent. 
 
1.2: Routines as Automatic, Involuntary, and Rote 
 
A wide range of behaviors varying in degrees of complexity can be labeled as automatic. The 
marker of automaticity is reserved for reflexive behaviors that are produced involuntarily. 7  A 
myoclonic jerk caused by a doctor’s hammer is involuntary and automatic. The more contentious 
issue is whether most instances of routine skilled behaviors are automatic in this way; as routines are 
many more times complex than simple reflexes. The two defining features of routines, that they are 
not reliant on conscious attention or awareness and that they are similar across all instances of their 
activation, gives us reasons to think that they are automatic. For example, here is a rather standard 
definition of automatic behavior: “Automatic processes are characterized as fast, effortless, (from a 
standpoint of allocation of cognitive resources), and unitized (or proceduralized)…” (Ackerman 
1987, 4). Routines are usually activated in very particular contexts or in the presence of discrete 
stimuli, and the ensuing movements are almost exact repetitions from previous instances of the 
behavior. Thus they are fast, effortless, and unitized. You might believe that the more general 
outline of the same input (hammer) yielding the same output (jerk) holds in a lot of cases of routine 
behaviors. In this section, I will provide some evidence for this claim. 
                                                   
6 You can see this point reflected in the characterization of intention above. If you require that all intentional behavior 
stem from a conscious decision, then it is easy to point out that no such conscious decision took place right before the 
behavior was produced. Mele (2009) provides a good critique of this characterization. 
7 I do not want to state strongly that all concepts of automaticity in behavior denote involuntary reflexes. But, I do think 
that the common definition of automatic behavior involves involuntary movements. My argument could ultimately fit 
with a less restrictive concept of automatic behavior.  
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 Routines fit the definition of automatic behavior. The problem here is that automatic 
behaviors are often described as involuntary and rote. If routine skills are automatic in nature, then 
many see that as precluding the possibility of an agent setting her routine behavior. What reasons do 
we have to think this? Two preliminaries appear frequently in the empirical literature. (1) Routines 
are often featured in cases where habituated behaviors undermine conscious intentions, otherwise 
known as double-capture error cases (Humphreys et al. 2003).8 A common example is one where an 
agent forms an intention to drive to the store on the way home from work, but she finds herself 
taking the familiar route home instead of the route to the store. The habit to follow the same route 
home everyday ends up defeating the created intention. Because the activation of routines do not 
need conscious attention, they have the quality of interfering with deliberated upon intentions 
because they can be initiated without the agent’s conscious consent. Many argue that this shows that 
some habits or routines are non-voluntary acts that we must fight against to produce intended acts 
(Ibid 202-206; Hommel 2007; Ouellette et al. 1998, 57). (2) Patients with significant frontal lobe 
damage often display utilization behavior, which is the initiation and production of routine or skilled 
behavior in inappropriate contexts (Ghika et al. 1995, Milner et al. 1984) For example, a patient 
presented with a toothbrush will start brushing her teeth despite the fact that she is in an 
examination room. In these cases, the patient does not have any conscious awareness that she is 
performing these behaviors and yet the produced behavior is produced without any performance 
errors (despite the inappropriate context). The common conclusion drawn is that all skilled behavior 
is produced without the need for conscious awareness, and what the pathological cases indicate are 
cases where the agent lacks the ability to inhibit the behavior. 
                                                   
8 The word “habituated” in this instance is a technical term referring to behaviors that are automatized. For clarification, 
I do not think that routines are habits. For one, habits sometimes have an explicit moral dimension that just is not 
present in many cases of routine behavior. Second, habits encompass a larger class of behaviors. For example, one could 
have the habit of going to the gym every weekday. This habit would contain multiple routines, but it could not be a 
routine itself under my definition.  
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Behaviors produced through double-capture errors (1) and pathological cases like utilization 
behavior (2) can be the  basis for a stronger view about routines (and skills in general).9 Routines, as 
behaviors with environment-driven goals, can be activated non-consciously and the guidance of the 
produced behavior are best explained through unconscious mechanisms of control (Bargh 2001, 
1015). This description is not only applied to “outlier” cases, like slips or utilization behavior. 
Rather, the automatic initiation and production of routine behavior just is the norm. Any conscious 
or deliberative act initiating a routine would be the outlier. Support for this position appears all over 
in the empirical literature. Libet’s timing experiments, for example, purportedly show that the feeling 
of intention occurs after the decision to act has been made as represented by a build of neuronal 
activity known as the readiness potential (Libet 1999).10 These timing experiments also provide a 
broad basis for theorists who claim that the “sense of agency” we have is actually just a post-hoc 
reconstruction created after the behavior has already been produced; even if we felt like we intended 
a certain act, it could just be an after-effect (Haggard et al. 2006). Skilled behavior is shown to be 
activated by non-declarative memory systems that are decidedly separated from semantic 
representations, and thus separated from a system that is more closely associated with deliberative 
reasoning and intentions (Reber 1996; Reber et al. 1994).11  Further, skilled behaviors are often 
compared to “fixed action patterns” that are gained through rote or procedural learning (Graybiel 
2008). These action patterns are pre-set organized behaviors that are activated independent of the 
agent and can be thought of as reflexes. 
                                                   
9 While this is not the only route in which people can arrive at the conclusion that routines are automatic, it is a popular 
one. (See: Jeannerod 1994; Marcel 2003) 
10 See (Lau et al. 2007) for an updated run of these timing experiments. 
11 This also connects to a common claim that routines and other skilled behaviors are hard to categorize as intentional 
because the movements of these behaviors are difficult to capture in language. In other words, people struggle with 
describing the specific movements of skilled actions. If you think that intentions are propositions, then you would have a 
hard time containing a given skilled behavior in a proposition. Luthra (2015, 2274-2275) provides a very lucid account of 
this objection. 
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 The seemingly automatic nature of routines make them a hard case for agency. Their 
repetitive nature and independence from focused attention make them apt to be described as 
automatic, rote, and involuntary. This description is backed up by a significant amount of empirical 
data, where the above is only a brief overview of a vast field. My aim in this paper is not to dispute 
any particular empirical experiment, but rather to question if the empirical experiments reveal the 
correct framework to analyze routines as either agential or non-agential.12 We could treat the matter 
as settled by this evidence, and many actually do, but we should question what kind framework this 
leaves us for analyzing behavior and further question if it is fair to any given theory of agency. In the 
next couple sections, I provide reasons for rejecting the idea that the empirical evidence as outlined 
give us a sufficient reason to accept routines as involuntary and non-agential.   
 
1.3: The Synchronic Viewpoint 
 
The power of the Libet timing experiments is in their details. In them, subjects are often 
instructed to move by flexing their wrist or moving their finger and then to report when they were 
aware of any “feeling” to move. The report of this awareness occurs 350-450ms after the readiness 
potential. This readiness potential is a build up of neuronal activity that is often taken to be a reliable 
indicator of a “decision” to act (Libet 1999, 49-52). This decision is to be understood as not 
involving the agent, but constituted by neural systems. These experiments have informed recent 
work on the “sense of agency” literature. A basic question this literature attempts to answer is this: 
how do we come to feel as if we have ownership over our behavior? A popular answer to this 
question is that the motor system computes the potential sensory consequences of a goal-oriented 
behavior and compares that “prediction” to the actual sensory consequences of the produced 
                                                   
12 There are already some critical examinations of Libet’s work that do a good job of calling into question the method 
and results of his timing experiments (See: Herdova 2016; Mele 2009; Schurger et al. 2012) 
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behavior.  If the prediction aligns with the actual sensory consequences, then the agent gains a 
feeling of intentionality. If the prediction does not align, then the agent feels as if the movements 
were caused involuntarily (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). Both the Libet 
timing experiments and the work done on the sense of agency have led many to conclude that 
intentionality in skilled behavior is just an after-effect. The real of cause of action is not the agent, 
but underlying neural mechanisms that initiate and guide behavior.  
 The relationship between these two works is an implicit (if not explicit) endorsement of a 
kind of explanatory framework. This is the synchronic viewpoint, and as explanatory framework it 
favors immediate factors over any diachronic factors when explaining behavior (especially skilled 
behaviors like routines).  If you produce a certain behavior, then the proper temporal time frame to 
examine and explain that behavior corresponds to the time frame of the neural activity that 
immediately precedes that behavior. The notion that routines are initiated and guided by 
unconscious mechanisms points to such a framework, as all of these mechanisms either occur right 
before the behavior takes place or are occurrent during the production.13 
This synchronic viewpoint thus constricts the relevant explanations for skilled behavior such 
that it pushes out standard agential factors practically by definition. It is hard to see how any theory 
of agency that incorporates diachronic factors can possibly cohere with the empirical evidence under 
this time frame. In fact, adopting the synchronic viewpoint makes it hard to explain any behavior in 
terms of the agent. This is partially why it has become increasingly popular to adopt a kind of 
“divided mind” view. For example, Daniel Wegner splits the individual into an illusory self and the 
actual, non-conscious mind (Wegner 2003, 268-270). The illusory self is the narrative driven self that 
                                                   
13 The emphasis on the proximate causes can also be seen in some works on skilled agency. It has become increasingly 
popular to solve the problem of skilled agency by appealing to attentional mechanisms (Wu, 2016). For example, one 
solution proposes that during a skilled activity an agent can shift her attention toward relevant stimuli that will activate 
the desired behavioral set (where this is understood as the series of behavior that is associated with that specific 
stimulus). (See Fridland 2014, and Christensen et al. 2016 for examples) The problem is that such a solution is an 
attempt to explain how some proximal causes can be agential. The problem is that coordination and strategy really only 
work for “expert” skills. Routines are more susceptible to being explained solely through unconscious mechanisms.  
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rationalizes behavior under the guise of the plan, but in reality there is a hidden and unconscious self 
that is the actually cause of all of our behaviors.14 This line of thought is an extreme example of 
taking the synchronic viewpoint too far and reaching the conclusion that no agential factors could 
possibly be reconciled with the empirical work. If we do divide the mind into two parts, it becomes 
easier to dismiss theories of intention like Bratman’s as pertaining only to over-intellectualized 
accounts of the self. There might be a deliberating self that sets global goals, but it would have little 
effect on large swaths of behaviors like routines.  
If we want to extend a historical or diachronic framework down to more seemingly rote 
behaviors like routines, then we cannot analyze routines in a limited temporal time span. Bratman 
and others can give a good account of how plans affect future behaviors by treating intentions as 
historical elements. The guise of a plan like “going to Thailand” does directs future conduct toward 
that plan. There is already an obvious path for explaining routines in a diachronic sense. Routines 
are learned patterns of behavior, which means that their creation is something we can analyze beyond 
the innate or extremely rigid reflexes like a myoclonic jerk. What I will argue in the next section is 
that we should also specify a practice element for routines to capture the two features mentioned 
earlier: (a) initiation without awareness or attention and (b) similarity of produced movements. 
 
Section 2 – Towards A New Framework 
 
2.1: Practice as History 
 
 Bratman argues that plans or intentions influence future behavior in two ways: (1) that plans 
cut off future practical reasoning about what to do, and (2) planning is conduct controlling in the 
                                                   
14 Pop-psychology also plays along, often telling the readers that there is a “hidden” and “disguised” mind that thwarts 
your better conscious intentions to change (O’Connor 2015; Wilson 2014). 
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relevant context (Bratman 1987, 16-17). For example, deciding to go to the store on Tuesday (1) 
cuts off other possibilities (i.e. the agent resists reconsideration when the time comes) and (2) the 
behavior facilitating the agent going to the store is intelligible because of the plan in place. Routines 
partly follow this line. They are often initiated without reconsideration, and without explicit 
deliberation. Further, as the context arises, the movements for a given routine are activated. In other 
words, tying your shoes does not allow for much reconsideration and the conditions for when to tie 
your shoes are “set” in advance. The problem is that routines are not plans (see Section 1.1). Merely 
deciding to make a set of movements routine or habitual is not enough to secure the two elements 
of routines. In other words, the creation of a routine is not determined by a decision alone. 
However, I will argue that practice can provide an explanatory framework that is not only diachronic 
but also encompasses Bratman’s planning conditions in regards to routines.  
Plans provide a historical element for the intermediate steps needed to fulfill that plan.15 
Routines cannot have the same kind of historical element because of their stringent conditions. 
Nonetheless, I assert that “practice” broadly construed can provide such an element for routines. 
This comes packed in with what practice amounts to: that practice is the repeated production of 
specific movements in certain contexts with the aim of making those movements automatic. While 
one cannot merely “plan” to tie a half-Windsor knot whenever needed, practicing tying a half-
Windsor knot will make sure that the relevant behavior occurs in the relevant context. This captures 
a significant aspect of routines that most theories of intention lack. Tying a knot is almost fully 
identified by the specific and successful movements of that routine. Practice grounds the 
mechanistic reproduction of those movements across all instances of the routine. We practice so 
                                                   
15 Beyond Bratman, I was also partly motivated by Mele’s Springs of Action. In this work, Mele argues that intentions 
provide a historical framework for explaining produced behaviors. He argues that if the intention was absent in certain 
cases, then the kind of explanation used to explain the given behavior would be very different (Mele 1992, 40-41).  
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that those movements become automatized. Planning to tie a knot is one thing, but practicing those 
movements fulfills what it is to come to have a routine for tying a tie. 
Practice also explains the unconscious mechanisms that lead to the proximal activation of 
that particular behavioral set. In other words, the context and the initiation and production of the 
particular movements can still be explained proximally through the use of unconscious mechanisms, 
but the historical element of practice provides an explanatorily primary way of understanding why 
that behavior occurred at all. This not only incorporates the diachronic elements, but is also 
consistent with the empirical literature as well. Practice connects up to the agent because we do need 
to set aside time and effort to actually practice, or more simply, we are aware of what we are doing 
when we practice those movements. Even if a routine is activated unconsciously, the behavioral set 
has to be explained in reference to the practice for that routine. In the next section, I will flesh out 
some of the specifics of this view.  
  
Section 3 - Agency in Practice 
 
3.1: Organized and Goal Directed 
 
While I have stated that practice is the historical element that explains routines with respect 
to the agent, there is still the matter of specifying how practice actually operates as a capacity of 
agency. Routines have special characteristics, namely that they can be produced without focused 
attention and that each instance of a given routine displays similar movements. Practice has a 
twofold job. It must explain these characteristics and explain them in a way that connects them to 
the agent. As such, there are two aspects of practice to consider: (1) practice organizes behavior to 
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not only respond to certain environmental stimuli but also sequences that behavior so that (2) the 
behavior is directed toward an agent specified goal. 
Practice functions to make a certain behavioral pattern concrete. That is to say, when an 
agent practices a series of movements it is so that those movements can be repeated with increased 
speed and accuracy at a later date. When we first learn how to tie a tie, our movements are clunky 
and we have to rely on conscious guidance to actually produce the behavior. Over time, the 
movements become easier to produce. An important feature of this practice is not just gaining 
speed, but also organizing that behavior in a certain sequence. Tying a tie successfully very much 
depends on the order of the movements. The idea that patterns of behavior are stored in a memory 
system is not new. Motor schemas are often evoked to explain how patterns of behavior are 
produced under set conditions (Jeannerod 1997, 128). These schemas are often thought of as motor 
plans that guide behavior when the relevant context emerges. Practice is one way that a schema can 
be created, and a schema can store the specific movements that a given routine is identified by 
(Jeannerod 1997, 119-125; Schmidt 1975, 235). 
Merely mentioning schemas as a basis for routines is not enough. The key idea is in how 
practice creates a motor schema. The sequence of movements in tying a tie is in service of the goal 
of tying a tie. I see this as a rather intermediate goal, distinct from both the higher order reason that 
compels you to learn how to tie a tie (like going to your first wedding) and the lower order control 
mechanics (the kinematics of your hand when grasping the tie). The distinct nature of intermediate 
goals concerns both the function of the object and the sequence of behavior necessary to realize that 
function. There are only so many ways to successfully tie a tie, and thus only so many ways to 
organize behavior to realize that intermediate goal. The point is that the intermediate goal and the 
created schema cannot be separated such that you can only analyze the behavior without mention of 
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the goal. This point is reflected in a lot of the literature on motor skill learning (Jeannerod 1997, 126-
127; Willingham 1998, 565–566) 
The interesting thing about much of the empirical literature concerning the unconscious 
activation of skillful behavior is that it focuses on the automatic and unconscious pursuit of goals. That 
is, goals activated by environmental stimuli and the pursuit of which is controlled by unconscious 
mechanisms. Part of what I am pushing in this paper is to focus on the creation of goals. Specifically, 
the creation of routine goals. The separation of the two is important, especially when it is often 
stated that the unconscious pursuit of goals is a signpost for involuntary actions. The empirical 
evidence might point to this unconscious pursuit being ubiquitous for skillful behavior, but it is far 
from clear what the unconscious creation of goals would look like. Explanations in terms of implicit 
learning or procedural learning have certain limits, as only very basic sequences can actually be 
learned in a completely rote manner (Logan 1985, 369-372). Further, conscious attention during the 
practice phase of any skill greatly increases the rate in which the skill is learned and how well it is 
performed (Ericsson et al. 1993, 367-369).16 Goal creation in this case will be the key component of 
agency, where practice is the primary means for achieving that goal in every instance in which it is 
activated. 
Practice creates schemas such that behavior is organized around a particular goal. Intuitively, 
practice is agent initiated. We need to find time to practice the movements and so forth. Further, the 
agent herself explicitly recognizes what the intermediate goals are and the correct sequence needed 
to accomplish that goal. It is not just that we practice how to tie a tie, but we specifically learn the 
movements of how to tie a Half-Windsor knot. The agent has a lot of control over how her practice 
is conducted. These points are reflected in the literature on “knowledge of results”. Knowledge of 
                                                   
16 There is a question about learning in a developmental context, where learning occurs and yet may be more implicit 
than learning as it occurs in our adult lives. I have little to say about this context, but there are certain questions that 
would need to be answered. First, it is unclear the extent that children learn only through rote practice. Second, it is 
unclear when children become agents. Finally, rational capacities can supersede and create new routines.  
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results is the incorporation of feedback in practice, and is a factor in creating or modulating schemas 
(Jeannerod 1997, 122). The referred to feedback is usually some kind of error detection. Error 
detection can only make sense with some concrete goal in mind, and for successful routine practice 
that goal must be agent directed. Gracefully executed movements mean very little if the proper 
sequence is not adhered to. The interesting thing about knowledge of results is that the 
“incorporation” of feedback usually comes in the form of conscious strategies (Willingham 1998, 
567). For example, recent literature on knowledge of results focuses on the use of mental simulation 
by subjects (Jeannerod 1997, 119-121). It has been shown the practice improves if subjects imagine 
themselves performing the skilled behavior repeatedly. The employment of conscious strategies in 
this case refers to making alterations in future planned movements by imagining how the practice 
ought to go. Thus, the agent consciously simulates the desired action, and then practices to achieve 
some mirror of that simulation. 
While my claims in this paper are mainly theoretical rather than empirical, I do want to note 
that the empirical literature has not decided the matter of routines as agential. Work on schemas and 
other areas do point to a compelling diachronic framework for analyzing routine behaviors. Once 
we recognize that the agent can be involved in the practice that structures the diachronic framework 
of routines, then we cannot so easily dismiss routine behavior as involuntary and non-agential.  
To close, we can see that even in the empirical realm there is doubt surrounding the idea that 
the proper viewpoint in explaining action is synchronic. In response to the Libet experiments, and 
the conclusion drawn that decisions to act were made before the subject even experienced the 
feeling of intending, Raymond Tallis (2011) said of the relatively small action the subjects were 
required to perform:  
Over the months, you have carried out a vast number of voluntary actions so that 
you might be able when required to perform an action that you could not carry out 
entirely voluntarily. Many of these preparatory actions have taken the form of 
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positioning yourself to have experience and acquire knowledge, deploying many 
intermediate steps in doing so. (254) 
 
This response is motivated by the fact that Libet’s experiment only concerned itself with moving 
one’s finger, a relatively small and simple movement taken out of a larger and more interesting 
context by the experimenters. In a similar fashion, Bernard Hommel (2009) notes that: 
 
Once they enter a lab, however, they are commonly talked into responding to 
arbitrary stimuli by carrying out meaningless movements…And yet, most models of 
action control seem to take this highly artificial stimulus-response situation so serious 
that they use it as a template for voluntary action in general. (512) 
 
 
Again, there are reasons to be suspicious of this view of action that only pertains to very minute if 
not arbitrary actions in a synchronic time frame. Substantial conclusions about the role of intention 
and how much control we have over our actions are drawn from this small time frame, and there are 
serious reasons to be concerned. What we do and how we ought not be solely explained either be 
introspective evidence concerning what you were thinking just before an action nor can it be fully 
captured by looking at small movements in a lab that is only concerned with a few milliseconds of 
activity. 
 
3.2: Agency in the Automatic 
 The overview of practice that supports the diachronic attribution of agency in routines 
fleshes out an important point of this paper. The agent can set the specific movements involved in a 
routine, whether that involves conscious deliberation or intentional planning. The idea is that 
practice primes certain movements to become routine under the guise of standard philosophical 
notions of agency. This allows us to expand the notion of automaticity to include aspects of agency, 
and not just refer to reflexive movements. The agent practices a set of movements so that they can 
be initiated and produced with ease. Everyone recognizes that tying our shoes by consciously 
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guiding each movement would be time consuming. Practicing, and thus memorizing, the correct 
patterns allows us to tie our shoes with little mental effort and little disruption.  
This allows us to take on certain cases of responsibility in a new light. Imagine a case where 
an individual who has received extensive military training causes harm to another individual because 
that training “kicked in” at the wrong moment or in the wrong context. It would be hard to 
condone or forgive the behavior under a synchronic view of skilled behavior, as we would have to 
parse out the behavior as non-agential. With the diachronic view in mind, however, we can give a 
fuller explanation in terms of the agent’s history. This has important implications for imparting 
responsible depending on the specifics of the case. 
 For example, we can imagine a case where a soldier was forced to commit to combat training 
and is now having a hard time adjusting to civilian life. If we take the standard Aristotelian account 
of coercion on its face, that coerced acts are involuntary in terms of moral responsibility, then it is 
plausible that the history presents some mitigating factors for imparting moral responsibility for this 
former soldier. This is a tough case, and I do not wish to present an obvious solution. What I do 
want to argue is that we can more aptly reason about this case by keeping the diachronic history as 
primary. This also becomes apparent if we think about certain prescriptive judgments concerning 
what a former soldier ought to do when no longer fighting. Words like “adjust” signals the fact that 
an individual must learn how not to activate those routines in a context that is clearly inappropriate 
for those routines. The automatization must be overridden, contained, or altogether destroyed. We 
can only explain these steps forward in terms of agency if we take the diachronic path and take 
practice as a power of the agent. 
 Less serious cases of responsibility also fall out of my framework. Learning how to drive a 
manual effectively is both necessary for keeping yourself safe as well as others. We can rightfully 
criticize someone driving on the freeway if they cannot operate the clutch very well. My account 
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does not even have to be applied to moral responsibility at all, as it seem likely that at one point 
most everyone has been criticized for not learning how to do something as if it was a routine. For 
example, a person who has to look up the instructions for using the coffee machine might just be 
subject to criticism if they use it daily. Factors of convenience, saving time, focus, etc. can all be 
evaluated more effectively if we do not always have to explain actions within a synchronic time 
frame.  
 
Section 4 – Objections/Worries 
 There are two objections to my account that I would like to briefly consider. (1) That this 
diachronic account of the attribution of agency muddles what we can say about pathological cases. 
(2) Double-capture error cases are still problematic. 
 
4.1: Pathological Cases 
 
 In section 1.1 I presented the case of UB patients, who automatically initiated certain routine 
behaviors in inappropriate contexts without any conscious awareness of what they were doing. This 
is a concern because if we take the diachronic picture, then these instances of routine behavior are 
agential in some sense because they have the relevant history. This is problematic because we do not 
want obvious cases of pathology to count as agent controlled behavior.  
Two things are worth considering. First, the creation of the routine by the agent still holds. 
In other words, patients with frontal lobe damage do not do routines they have not created. I 
highlight this because it is important to note that the pathology involved with UB centers on the 
synchronic control of already learned behaviors. Thus, there is good reason to say that these 
behaviors are partially agential. They are not pre-determined in the same way a myoclonic jerk is, nor 
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are they completely random motions of the body. There is a sense in which the patterns of 
behaviors activated are successful.  
Second, I have not presented a full account of what it is to be an agent. What I have argued 
for is that certain patterns of behavior can be considered agential if we take into account their 
diachronic history. This does not preclude the possibility that there are other conditions that would 
prevent the patterned behavior from being non-agential. If these cases truly show that the patients 
are unable to inhibit their behaviors, it is unclear that these patients are actually fully operational 
agents. Part of being an agent might be having the power to inhibit a certain routine at a certain 
time, if she is aware of the routine going awry.17  
 
4.2: Slips 
 
This leads into the second concern, there still seems to be the problem of “slips” where 
habituated routines undermine other intentions. Under my account, these routines are still agential 
even if they defeat consciously set intentions (like going to the store on the way home from work). 
My answer hangs on a slight twist of my answer to the previous problem. 
Imagine that someone pointed out to you that your form when doing a push-up was actually 
harmful to your shoulders. After learning the correct form, you are now tasked with modifying or 
outright replacing the old routine. A requirement on any modification of the old routine would be to 
pay attention to your movements such that you can be sure that you are correctly implementing the 
new form. If you happen to do a set of push-ups where you used the old and harmful form, it would 
                                                   
17 Having the power to inhibit is much more vague than having the wherewithal to inhibit. However, I must go with the 
more vague terminology. If I agreed that a condition on being an agent is to have the wherewithal to inhibit behavior 
then I would have to concede that all double-capture error cases are non-agential. But, having the power to inhibit 
merely implies that it is possible for the agent to inhibit the behavior if she was aware of it. UB patients do not even have 
this luxury. 
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be appropriate to chastise yourself for not paying enough attention to what you were doing. Thus, it 
seems like we can blame the agent in certain situations for failing to pay close enough attention to 
their bodily movements when it is clear that the situation demands the alteration of a routine. The 
point is not that the bad habit is non-agential, but that the activation of the routine was a failure to 
inhibit by the agent.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that certain mundane behaviors that appear to be automatic when 
looking at their proximate causes can be accounted for under the umbrella of conscious agency if a 
diachronic framework is utilized. Doing so allows us to better explain how agents actually functions, 
as routines appear to constitute a good majority of our daily activities. Losing the ability to explain 
such routines as agential would make most of what we do mechanistic. Aspects of personality and 
responsibility would be lost, or harder to explain in traditional intentional terms. Even if routines 
represent the mundane, they are still worth preserving as agential.   
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